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Abstract
In this paper we study optimal monetary and scal policies, and the welfare costs of ina-
tion, within the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. Monetary equilibria may be inecient
without scal policy tools due to bargaining frictions. We show that subsidies in decen-
tralized markets can be implemented to alleviate underproduction, while money is still
essential. Deviations from the Friedman rule may be large, and having scal and mon-
etary policies in place results in considerable welfare gains. When scal policies are held
constant, the welfare costs of increasing ination may be as high as 8% of lifetime consump-
tion. When lump sum monetary transfers are not available, a positive production subsidy
may be inationary and welfare reducing. However, sales taxes in the decentralized market
and production taxes in the centralized market may increase welfare. The optimality of
the Friedman rule in this case depends crucially on the bargaining power of the buyer, and
equilibria are not rst best.
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11 Introduction
Since Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) search theoretic models have been used frequently to
formalize the role of money as a medium of exchange, thus providing microeconomic foundations
for monetary economics. The basic building blocks of this class of models are trading risk and
trade in decentralized markets in which buyers and sellers are anonymous, no record-keeping is
possible, and terms of trade are determined by bilateral bargaining. Despite the widespread use
of search theoretic models of monetary exchange, little is known about the nature of optimal
scal and monetary policies. This paper attempts to contribute to a better understanding of
the properties of optimal scal and monetary policies, and of the welfare costs of ination in a
version of the widely used search model of Lagos and Wright (2005).
The key features of this model are quasilinear preferences and the possibility of trade in both
decentralized and centralized markets. These features keep the model analytically tractable and
easy to quantify. It is also known that when lump sum monetary transfers are the only instrument
available, and if the buyer does not have all the bargaining power, then monetary equilibria are
not ecient. Moreover, the welfare costs of ination are substantially larger than what is found
in models in which money is introduced with ad hoc assumptions, and the Friedman rule is the
unique optimal policy.
Our analysis considers alternative scal instruments to study the following issues. First, can
scal and monetary policy restore eciency of equilibria when the buyer does not have all the
bargaining power? Second, what is the magnitude of the welfare costs of ination once scal
policy is also available? Finally, is the Friedman rule an optimal policy when negative lump sum
transfers are not available?
Two frictions hinder the eciency of equilibrium in the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework.
First, in monetary exchanges agents pay a cost today (production) to receive a future benet
(money that can be used to purchase goods in future trades).1 The second friction is a direct
consequence of the properties of Nash's solution to the bargaining problem.2 In particular,
unless the buyer has all bargaining power, Nash's solution implies that the buyer's surplus from
a given match is not monotone in monetary holdings. Thus, buyers hold too little cash and
underproduction exists in the decentralized market. When lump sum monetary transfers are
the only instrument and the buyer does not have all the bargaining power, the Friedman rule
eliminates the rst friction and attenuates the impact of the second. However, equilibrium
allocations are not ecient. In this paper, we propose dierent scal and monetary policies that
can restore eciency of monetary equilibrium.
Because there are two potential sources of friction in the economy, a complete tax system
requires two instruments. More important, constructing appropriate scal policies in a micro-
1Note that this feature is also present in applied models with ad hoc assumptions regarding at money.
2For more details see Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007).
2founded monetary model requires taking into account the anonymity of trading partners and the
impossibility of record-keeping. Thus, it is necessary to construct taxes on activities that take
place in the decentralized market without violating information restrictions. Implementation of
our scal and monetary policies requires that agents disclose their money holdings. Agents that
increase their money holdings (producers) are given a monetary subsidy.3 Incentives are well
aligned for agents to truthfully report money holdings because a subsidy is received.
Production subsidies, paid in money, can be used to increase production in the decentralized
market but they may be inationary. If costless lump sum monetary transfers are available,
these can be used to extract the money introduced through the subsidy and thus ination can
be easily contained. In this environment, we nd multiple combinations of taxes, subsidies, and
(sometimes strictly positive) ination rates such that eciency is attained. In addition, the
Friedman rule is always an optimal policy regardless of the value of the bargaining power of
the buyer. Moreover, since equilibrium under the optimal policy is ecient, the welfare costs of
increasing ination from the Friedman rule rate to 10% are up to 8% of lifetime consumption.
The latter is 1.6% points higher than what is obtained without scal policy.
When lump sum monetary transfers are not available, the production subsidy is ination-
ary, which may magnify the distortions of the model. Hence, we consider a new set of scal
instruments. We rst consider a sales tax in the decentralized market because this allows the
government to retire money from circulation, thus making the Friedman rule feasible. We also
introduce a production tax in the centralized market, which alters the bargaining position of
agents, and ultimately results in higher production in the decentralized market. In this type
of environment, we nd monetary equilibrium is never ecient. The Friedman is optimal only
when the buyer has relatively low bargaining power. Finally, we nd that the welfare gains of
having scal and monetary policies in place are substantial.
The paper closest in spirit to ours is that of Aruoba and Chugh (2008), who study the
dynamic Ramsey problem in the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. However, these authors
are interested in analyzing the business cycle frequency properties of optimal monetary and scal
policy with positive government expenditures in a model that includes government bonds and
capital assets. Fiscal and monetary instruments are restricted to (i) production and capital
taxes in the centralized market and (ii) to open market operations. Equilibrium in their model is
not ecient, the Friedman rule is typically not optimal and ination is stable over time. These
authors also nd that because capital is under accumulated, the optimal policy includes a subsidy
on capital income. In a dierent environment, in which the total number of trade matches is
determined by a matching function and search intensities are optimally chosen by households,
3Note that in order to implement these policies, the government does not need to know the identity of each
buyer and seller, thus preserving the anonymity of trading partners and the necessity of having money as a
medium of exchange.
3Ritter (2007) nds that an optimal policy may consist of both a positive tax rate and a positive
nominal interest rate. Monetary, but not scal, policy alters the agent's bargaining position,
leaving a special role for a deviation from the Friedman rule.
The ndings of this paper and those of Aruoba and Chugh (2008) and Ritter (2007) conrm
the observation by Kocherlakota (2005) and Wright (2005) that scal and monetary policies
may have important interactions, particularly in frameworks with microeconomic foundations
for the existence of at money, and should always be jointly considered in the design of optimal
government policy.
The reminder of our paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and
contains the main results of the paper and derives the properties of optimal scal and monetary
policy under dierent government instruments. Each subsection includes a set of numerical
experiments deriving the quantitative implications of the theory, the welfare benets of optimal
scal and monetary policy, and the welfare costs of ination. Section 3 summarizes our nding
and conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 The economic environment
The economy has a continuum of agents that live forever. The representative agent of this
economy derives utility from consumption and disutility from labor. Each period is divided into
two subperiods labeled day and night. Consumption and production take place during both, day
and night. Preferences over streams of consumption and labor during the day, denoted by x and





t[u(xt)   ht + U(Xt)   Ht]; (1)
where the utility functions u(:) and U(:) are twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and
strictly concave. Finally, we assume that u(0) = 0 and that all consumption goods are non-
storable. Money is also available to agents in this economy, it is perfectly divisible, and storable
in any quantity m  0.
The day good comes in many varieties, and each individual agent produces a good that
she does not consume. To simplify our analysis we assume that double coincidence of wants
is impossible. Since no record-keeping is possible in the decentralized market, the only feasible
trade during the day is the exchange of goods for money. Money is essential in sense that the
welfare level achieved when money is available is higher than it would be possible without money.
In other words, in an environment with anonymous trade and no-record keeping without money,
4it would be impossible for trade to take place in the decentralized market.
The probability of a meeting in the decentralized market is . Moreover, given two agents,
i and j; the probability that agent i consumes what agent j produces (a single coincidence) is
  1
2. Symmetrically, the probability that j consumes what i produces is equal to . The
probability that neither wants what the other produces is 1   2.
During the night subperiod agents trade a general good that everyone can produce and wants
to consume in a centralized Walrasian market. The only feasible trade during the night involves
general goods and money.
The economy we have described until this point is exactly the same as that in Lagos and
Wright (2005), who study the properties of optimal monetary policy with a single instrument:
costless lump sum monetary transfers. In this section, we evaluate the eciency properties of
monetary equilibrium, and the welfare costs of ination, once a monetary production subsidy,
nanced by money printing, is available. Of course, the informational requirements for the
implementation of such policy must be considered carefully. For money to be essential it should
not be possible to monitor transactions in decentralized markets. In our model, agents that
request a subsidy must disclose changes in their money holdings between the last period's central
market and the start of the current period's central market. A monetary subsidy at constant
rate s  0 is provided to agents that have increased their real money holdings (when they were
producers in the day market).4 The government must print money to pay for this subsidy.
Notice that when a production subsidy is in place agents have a clear incentive to truthfully
reveal changes in monetary holdings. In particular, truthful revelation results in a positive
money transfer.
Knowledge of changes in money holdings by the government may still be considered as re-
quiring too much information. Then it is important to note that our results can be extended to
a framework in which the only required information is current money holdings before entering
the centralized market. The analysis of such a model is much more convoluted and obscures our
point. Hence, we have chosen to keep the analysis simple and proceed with the version of the
model with stronger informational requirements.5
The trades, timing, and redistributions of resources considered in this model are summarized
in Figure 1.
4All the redistribution of resources takes place in the Walrasian market where we assume there is perfect
information, all actions are observable and that the government can collect and redistribute taxes.
5The economic intuition works as follows: consider an equilibrium sequence of money holdings, fme
tg, from
the model that requires knowledge of changes in monetary holdings. Let this sequence be given. Dene a subsidy
rate function equal to zero when agents report money holdings lower than me
t; and equal to s if agents hold at
least me
t: This function will not alter any of the important properties of equilibrium, in particular the fact that
the distribution of money is degenerate. Furthermore, agents will nd it optimal to choose money holdings equal
to me
t: There are no incentives to deviate since reporting less money results in no subsidy. Conversely, the payo
of carrying more money is as good as it would be in the more restrictive model. The key features of stationary
equilibria are the same as those of the more restricted model.
5Bargaining in Decentralized Market Centralized Market
Start with m units of $
Seller produces (cost q), receive
D units of $ from buyer
Buyer obtains q units of the good
pays D units of $ to seller
Government monitors $ holdings
Print $ necessary to give sD
units of $ to agents that 
increased $ holdings by D
Leave with m’ units of $
Trade
Lump sum $ transfers
Seignoriage
Figure 1: Timing.
The problem of the representative agent consists of maximizing expected utility while taking
prices, subsidy rates, and the distribution of money holdings of other agents as given. During the
decentralized market the agent knows that with probability  that she will trade, and that with
probability  she will be either a buyer or a seller. Notice that, to simplify our presentation, we
abstract from double-coincidence meetings. Consumption (production), q, and money payments
(receipts), D, in the decentralized market will be determined by bargaining. The representative
agent knows the corresponding functional forms. We denote by m the money holdings of the rep-
resentative agent, by ~ m the holdings of a partner in a given match, and by F(~ m) the distribution
of money holdings. Then, the recursive formulation of the representative agent is characterized,
rst, by the value function associated to the day market
Vt(m) = 
Z
fu(q(m; ~ m))+W t (m D(m; ~ m))gdF t(~ m)+ (2)
+ 
Z
f q(~ m;m) + W t (m + (1 + s)D(~ m;m))gdF t(~ m)+
+ (1   2)W t(m);
which includes the value function W(m) of trading in the centralized market (which is precisely
dened below).
Terms of trade in the decentralized market are determined endogenously in a bargaining
game. Following the literature, we consider the generalized Nash bargaining solution where the
buyer has bargaining power 0< 1; and threat points are given by no trade:
max
q;D
fu(q) + W(m   D)   W (m)g
 f q + W(~ m + (1 + s)D0   W (~ m)g
1  (3)
s:t: D  m:
It is well understood, that the generalized Nash bargaining solution may not satisfy strong
6monotonicity. In a version of the model with no subsidies, Aruoba, Waller, and Rocheteau (2007)
have shown that the lack of monotonicity of the buyer's surplus when <1 causes monetary
equilibrium to be inecient. In particular, there will be underproduction in the decentralized
market. As it is clear from equation (3), subsidies will aect the optimal D and q resulting from
the Nash bargaining game. One of our main objectives is to understand how subsidies aect the
buyer's surplus, and to determine whether the rst best allocation can be reached.
The recursive formulation of the representative agent's problem is completed by the following
denition of the value function associated with the centralized market:
Wt(mt) = max
X;H;mt+1
fU(X)   H + Vt+1(mt+1 + T)g (4)
s:t: X = H + t(mt   mt+1);
where t denotes the value of money balances at the centralized market. Finally, the mone-
tary authority can provide lump sum monetary transfers, T, after trades have concluded in the
centralized market.
To close the model, notice that the money supply is determined by the government. Money




where Mt denotes the money supply. The government must print money in order to fund pro-
duction subsidies. Recall that in the decentralized market only a fraction  of the population
actually trades goods for money. Let m1 be the growth rate in the money supply that results
from paying subsidies. This yields the relation
s
Z Z
D(m; ~ m)dFt(m)dF(~ m) = m1;tMt: (5)
Observe then that money subsidies have the potential of generating ination. Let m2;t be
the growth rate in the money supply by the end of the centralized market, when all lump sum
monetary transfers have occurred. The total growth in the money supply from one period to the
next is then (1 + m1)(1+m2): Since costless negative lump sum transfers are available, m2< 0,
it is possible to undo the aforementioned inationary pressures.
Finally, we assume available time for production in the centralized market is bounded above
by  H; and impose the market-clearing condition that total demand must equal the available
supply, namely
H = X: (6)
72.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy consists of sequences of prices and money-holding distributions
ft;Ftg, production and money payments in the decentralized market fqt;Dtg; and production,
consumption, and money carried for future purchases from the centralized market fHt;Xt;mt+1g
that meet the following conditions
1. fqt;Dt;Xt;Ht;mt+1g solve the representative agent's problem taking the Nash bargaining
functions, prices, subsidies, lump sum monetary transfers, and the distribution of money
holdings as given.
2. The government funds subsidies by money printing, that is, equation (5) holds at all t  0:
3. All markets clear, and all aggregate resource constraints are satised at all t  0:
4. There is consistency between beliefs and the actual distribution of money.
2.3 Analysis of the model
The rst important property of equilibrium in this model is that the value function of the central-
ized market during the night subperiod is linear in m; with slope . This result is easily derived
by solving for H in the constraint of equation (4) and substituting its value into the objective
function. The linearity of the value function associated with trading in the centralized market
keeps the model tractable. In particular, it implies that all agents choose mt+1 independently of
the money balances, mt, with which they entered the market.





 f q + D(1 + s)g
1  (7)
s:t: D  m: (8)
After multiplying both sides of constraint (8) by ; it is clear that the above maximization
problem depends only on real monetary balances, zt
def
= tmt: If we let d
def
= D, the solution to
the generalized Nash bargaining problem (7) is given by the following result.
Proposition 1 Given a subsidy rate s; an interior solution to the generalized Nash bargaining
8problem is given by:
d(z; ~ z) =

z if z < zu
zu if z  zu
q(z; ~ z) =

^ q if z < zu
qu if z  zu
where qu and zu are the solutions to the rst-order conditions of the maximization problem (7),
ignoring the cash constraint of the buyer [equation (8)]:
f q
u + z
u (1 + s)gu
0(q





u (1 + s)g = (1   )fu(q
u)   z
ug(1 + s): (10)
When the cash constraint is binding, d = z; then ^ q is given by the solution to the rst-order
condition of (7):
f ^ q + z (1 + s)gu
0(^ q) = (1   )fu(^ q)   zg: (11)
As Proposition 1 indicates, a key feature of the model is that the functions characterizing
the bargaining game do not depend on the real money holdings of the seller. The latter is a key
property of Lagos and Wright (2005) and carries over to our version of the model with subsidies.
The new element here is that the function determining production in the decentralized market
is positively related to the subsidy rate in the centralized market.
Corollary 2 For each value of the real money holdings of the buyer, production in the decen-
tralized market, q(z), is increasing in s.







Hence, the concavity of u(:) yields that qu is increasing in s. To establish that ^ q is increasing in





( u0 + u00 ( ^ q + z(1 + s)))   (1   )u0:
Thus, given the monotonicity and concavity of u(:); the participation constraint  ^ q+z(1+s)  0,
the above derivative is positive; thus, ^ q is increasing in s:
As can be seen from Corollary 2, the well-known result from public nance that subsidies to
production tend to increase it, also holds here.
9Observe that Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 take the money holdings of the agent as given.
Obviously, the agent chooses its money holdings optimally. We proceed to analyze the determi-
nants of this decision. The structure of the bargaining solution for this model simplies greatly
the problem of the representative agent. This is captured by Corollary 3 below. The resulting
characterization of the representative agent's problem is used repeatedly throughout our analysis.
Corollary 3 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the problem of the representative consumer
can be written as follows:
Wt(mt) = max
mt+1;X
[fU(X)   X + (t+1   t)mt+1g (12)
+ fu(q(mt+1))   t+1D(mt+1)g]
+
Z
f q(~ m) + (1 + s)t+1D(~ m)gdF t+1(~ m):
As is now well understood, additional regularity conditions on u(:) can be imposed so that
the solution to mt+1 to the above problem is unique. The latter yields a degenerate distribution
of money holdings, which keeps the model analytically tractable.
Hereafter, our analysis will be restricted to stationary monetary equilibrium. These equilibria
have prices that grow at a constant rate and real money holdings are strictly positive. Finally,






U(X) = B log(X); with B; b > 0; and 0 <  < 1;
which correspond to the preferences used by Lagos and Wright (2005) for their quantitative
analysis.
The problem of the representative agent can be written as above, in which money holdings
are chosen and q is determined in the bargaining game. Notice, however, that it is also possible to
think of the problem of the representative agent as that of choosing q; with real money holdings
given by z(q). This alternative characterization of the representative agent's problem is useful
later in establishing the welfare properties of equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Consider any given subsidy and a sequence of prices that grows at rate (1 + );
then the representative agent's problem can be written as:
(X
e;q
e) = arg max
X;q2[0; q]






z(q) +  fu(q)   z(q)g

(13)
Moreover, the solution to the above problem satises qe<qu and z<zu.
10Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that if z > zu then q = qu for all z: For monetary equilibrium





 0: If the latter term is equal to zero, then the objective of






Thus, it suces to consider the range zzu. From the rst-order condition, equation (11), it is
possible to dene the output that solves the bargaining problem as a function of z: This function
is invertible so that
z(q) 
(1   )u(q) + u0(q)q
(1 + s)u0(q) + (1   )
:
It is easy to verify that  z0(q)<0 for all q: To evaluate the monotonicity properties of the buyer's
surplus fu(q)   z(q)g; we follow Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007). In particular, the rst
order condition of the bargaining problem with respect to q yields

(1   )
f q + z(1 + s)gu
0(q) = fu(q)   zg:
Then, we substitute z into the left-hand side of the above equation to determine the following:
(1   )u0
(1 + s)u0 + (1   )
[u(q)(1 + s)   q] = fu(q)   zg: (14)
Taking derivatives shows that the left hand side of equation (25) is non-monotone and that it is
negative as q % qu: The latter fact, paired with  z0(q)< 0; implies that in any optimum qe<qu;
so that z<zu:
Proposition 4 explicitly shows the trade-o of holding real balances and consuming. In
particular, if a seller could turn the proceeds from her production into immediate consumption,
as in a static or frictionless model, then the seller would produce until marginal utility equals
marginal cost. In a monetary exchange economy, however, the proceeds from production consist
of cash that can only be spent in the future.
2.4 Optimal scal and monetary policy
This section considers the government's problem of choosing subsidies and monetary transfers
to maximize social welfare with full commitment. Thus, we are contemplating an environment
in which the government sets an inationary and scal plan that will not change over time. As
a result, lags in scal policies are not considered in here since we abstract from the process that
makes the design of scal policy lengthier than the monetary one. Moreover, because our analysis
focuses on the comparison of dierent long-run stationary equilibria, temporary delays in scal
policy will have no impact on the gures we report.
Denition 5 An ination rate and a production subsidy (;s) are optimal if they solve the
11following problem:
max











z(q) +  fu(q)   z(q)g

(16)
m1 = s (17)







According to Denition 5, the government's problem consists of choosing ination and subsidy
rates that maximize social welfare subject to the constraint that production and consumption in
both markets are stationary monetary equilibria.
Observe that the availability of lump sum monetary transfers at the end of the centralized
market can neutralize any increase of the money supply from the payment of monetary subsidies
at the centralized market (where we measure ination).
Molico (2006), Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005), and Deviatov and Wallace (2001),
among others, have provided examples in which a policy that consists of increasing the money
supply through lump sum transfers induces some redistribution across individuals. Our paper
also emphasizes the importance of distributional eects when examining the Friedman rule. The
source of our heterogeneity is the asymmetric scal treatment of buyers and sellers. Redistribu-
tion of resources between buyers and sellers is possible through production subsidies and lump
sum injections/withdrawals of money in the decentralized market. To illustrate the importance
of distributional eects consider an economy where ination is higher than the Friedman rule.
If the growth rate of the money supply is lowered there are two eects. All agents are better o
because the monetary ineciency is reduced. However, wealth is transferred from agents who
hold little money to those who hold more. This eect may worsen the position of those with
little money. If transfers are allowed, then society can undo the latter eect with the result
of all agents being better o. Society cannot undo the latter eect without transfers, and the
Friedman rule is not necessarily Pareto optimal.
The main result of this section establishes that scal and monetary policies can restore the
eciency of monetary equilibria in spite of the non-monotonicity of the buyer surplus implied
by the Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 6 Consider any given value of the buyer's bargaining weight, 0 <   1; and any
given ination rate      1. Then, as b ! 0, there exist values of s and 
m2 that solve the
optimal taxation and achieve rst-best equilibrium allocations in both markets.
12Proof. Eciency in the decentralized market requires q= 1: Since qu  qe and qu = (1 + s)
1
  b,
a necessary condition for eciency is s 0. Moreover, it is then possible to solve for s in
the rst-order condition (16) at qe= 1: Moreover, we show in the Appendix that the rst-
order condition characterizes the solution to the households problem qe: Hence, eciency in
decentralized trades can be achieved. Notice that X= B satises the rst order condition of
the household in the central market, and is also rst best, establishing the desired result.
Proposition 6 suggests that the extra resources given to producers through production sub-
sidies can provide extra incentives for sellers to produce up to the ecient level. Given that
production subsidies must be monetized and the government has access to lump sum monetary
taxes the government can always undo the ination that may result from these subsidies. Finally,
we note that the Friedman rule belongs to the set of optimal policies as long as the bargaining
power of the buyer is strictly positive.
2.5 Quantitative analysis
We now study the quantitative implications of the theory for the eciency of equilibrium, the
welfare gains of optimal scal and monetary policy, and the welfare costs of ination. Notice
that the standard velocity equation
MV = PY;
where M is the money demand, P is the price level and Y is output, can be easily mapped into
the variables of this model. First, the price level corresponds, in the model, to the prices of goods
in a centralized market, 1
. Real output Y in units of the centralized market equals B + M;





Finally, notice that equation (13) can be used to determine q, and therefore V , as a function
of the nominal interest rate 1+
   1. The latter then can be used to derive the money demand
implied by the model.
For ease of comparison with existing analyses, we used one of the parameterizations derived
by Lagos and Wright (2005). In this parameterization the model with taxes and subsidies set at
zero provides the best t of the model to the annual \money demand" data of the United States.
In this calibration a period is interpreted as one year (over which the day and the night markets
occur). The interest rate data employed in this exercise are the annual commercial paper rate
while M is measured by M1: The sample period was 1900 through 2000.
The annual rate of time preference is set at r = 0:04. Moreover, we normalize  to 1 and
 = 0:5, which means that every agent always has an opportunity to either buy or sell in each
13meeting of the decentralized market. Lagos and Wright (2005) show that parameter  is dicult
to identify and report results for three dierent values of this parameter. We pick the set of
parameters that yield the largest welfare costs of ination, in particular, we let  = 0:343;
 = 0:39;b  0,  = 1 and B = 1:78. Hence, our quantitative analysis of the welfare costs of
ination can be taken as a measure of the maximum gains that can be obtained by having active
monetary and scal policy. Some results for alternative parameterizations are also reported.
2.5.1 Quantitative implications of optimal scal and monetary policies
We start by clarifying the mechanisms behind our key theoretical results. Figure 2 depicts the


















Figure 2: Objective of the representative agent as function of the subsidy rate and q: [Note: qu(s =
0) = 1; qu(s = 0:1) = 1:28; qu(s = opt) = 1:77:]
Since we use the generalized Nash solution for the bargaining game in the decentralized
market, the buyer's surplus is non-monotone in qu; and the maximum is attained to the left
of qu: Moreover, Corollary 2 shows that qu increases as the subsidy, s, increases. Hence, higher
subsidies push both qu and the representative household's optimal output, qe, to the right. These
are the economic forces behind Proposition 6, where it is shown that a level of subsidies can be
chosen to restore eciency of monetary equilibrium.
Second, we illustrate the properties of equilibria with and without scal policy. In particular,
Table 1 presents dierent cases of scal and monetary policies that solve the government's prob-
lem with the resulting ination, optimal output level for decentralized and centralized market,
and the optimal subsidy rate. Table 1 also shows in the second row the Lagos and Wright (2005)
experiment where the Friedman rule is the only optimal policy.
As seen, the output costs of abstracting from optimal scal policy are signicant: Output
during the pairwise trade period falls by 40% relative to rst best, which can be attained with
a combination of monetary and scal policies. Notice that money printing required to pay for
14Table 1: Welfare Maximizing Policies
 q X s
-3.8% 0.56 1.78 -
-3.8% 1.0 1.78 25%
0% 1.0 1.78 61%
the subsidy would imply a total growth rate in the money supply of at least 12%. However, the
ination rates we report are low. Hence, an optimal policy requires undoing most of the money
printing by extracting money after the night market is closed by using lump sum (negative)
transfers. Finally, notice that the production subsidy is not a redundant tax since without such
subsidy eciency cannot be attained. Section 2.6 below shows that costless lump sum monetary
transfers are not redundant either.
A more detailed analysis of the properties of the optimal subsidy rate is shown in Figure
3. The graphs illustrate the dierent monetary subsidy rates required to restore eciency of
monetary equilibrium under dierent ination rates, and for values of the buyer's bargaining
weight  2 [0:2;1]:
Figure 3: Optimal subsidy rates for dierent ination rates and buyer's bargaining weights.
The behavior of the optimal subsidy rate is quite intuitive. In particular, the subsidy rate
decreases monotonically in the bargaining weight of the buyer and increases in the ination
rate. A higher bargaining power for the buyer means that less of the surplus associated with
holding money will be taken away. As a result, current producers require a lower compensation
to achieve the socially optimal level of production in the decentralized market. When the buyer
has all bargaining power ( ' 1) then the Friedman rule suces to make equilibrium allocations
Pareto optimal. Under these circumstances no hold-up problem exists. With ination above the
Friedman rule, a hold-up problem is created and a positive subsidy rate is required to achieve
15optimality, even when the buyer has full bargaining power. Naturally, the size of the optimal
subsidy increases as the bargaining power of the buyer decreases for any given ination rate.
In summary, when lump sum monetary transfers are possible, multiple subsidy rates and
(sometimes strictly positive) ination rates exist that can yield the ecient allocation. In this
environment, the Friedman rule is one of the possible policy options that is available to the
government that yields eciency. Moreover, a production subsidy is not a redundant tax. Finally,
the Friedman rule belongs to the set of optimal policies regardless of the value of the bargaining
power of the buyer.
2.5.2 The Welfare costs of ination
Assessing the welfare costs of ination requires a sound understanding of the benets of monetary
exchange. We now recast the classical analysis of the welfare costs of ination in a setting where
the existence and need for money is based on micro foundations and scal policies are considered.
It is important to note that, according to Proposition 6, if scal and monetary policy adjust
simultaneously, then for any given ination rate there is a subsidy that makes monetary equilibria
ecient. As a result, there are no welfare costs of ination. We still consider it interesting,
nevertheless, to perform an exercise similar to that of Lucas (2000). We thus compute the
percentage of consumption that an agent, living in an economy with optimal scal and monetary
policies, would be willing to give up in avoid being in an economy where the ination rate varies,
while scal policies are held xed. Our results are reported in Table 2 below. The second and
third columns of this table consider the case  = 0:343; which is the calibration in Lagos and
Wright that yields the largest ination welfare loss. To compare with the results of the previous
literature, the second column of Table 2 reproduces the welfare costs of ination in the case
where lump sum monetary transfers are the only available tool. Finally, the last column of Table
2 reports the case  ' 1, where the costs of ination are minimized.








-2% 0:5% 0:6% 0:03%
0% 1:6% 1:9% 0:2%
4% 3:9% 4:8% 0:5%
6% 4:9% 6:2% 0:7%
8% 7:4% 6:2% 1:0%
10% 8:4% 6:8% 1:3%
Table 2 shows that the costs of ination can be considerably larger than what Lagos and
Wright originally found. The welfare costs of ination of our benchmark economy, where the
16optimal policies are able to achieve eciency, can be as large as 8% of consumption. Finally, the
welfare costs of ination increase as the bargaining power of the buyer decreases.
In this environment, the ination tax introduces a wedge in the decision to invest in real
balances. The extent of this distortion depends crucially on the assumed pricing mechanism.
The basic intuition behind this large welfare cost of ination is the notion of a hold-up problem
as we move away from the Friedman rule. In other words, an agent that carries a dollar into
the next period is making an investment with cost equal to the value of money. When the agent
spends money, she reaps all of the returns to her investment if and only if  ' 1. Otherwise, the
seller \steals" part of the surplus. Thus, whenever  < 1 there is a reduction in the incentive
to invest, lowering the demand for money and hence production in the decentralized market.
This phenomenon becomes more important once scal instruments are in place because more
production is possible under the optimal subsidy rate.
Our previous ndings then suggest that ignoring active scal policies can be quite costly.
Thus knowing the empirical \money demand" curve is not enough; what really needs to be
understood in order to correctly estimate the welfare cost of ination are the micro economic
foundations of the money demand, and especially how the terms of trade are determined and
aected by policy actions.
2.5.3 The Welfare value of scal policy
We now measure the welfare value of optimal scal policy. Our analysis is symmetric to that
in the previous section. In particular, we compute the lifetime consumption value of living in a
world in which optimal policies are implemented, relative to living in a world where scal policy
deviates from the optimum. Ination is held constant throughout alternative experiments.
Our results are reported in Table 3, in which two initial optimal policies, denoted by 
and s; are taken as departing points. The alternative, suboptimal, subsidy rates considered
are reported in the rst and third columns of the table, whereas the implied welfare costs are
reported in the second and fourth columns.
Table 3: Welfare Costs of Fiscal Policy Starting from Optimality
 =    1; s = 25%  = 0; s = 60%
s Welfare Cost s Welfare Cost
20% 0.04% 48% 0.17%
15% 0.16% 36% 0.62%
10% 0.37% 24% 1.33%
5% 0.65% 12% 2.25%
0% 1.01% 0% 3.35%
The rst important observation is that the welfare costs of changing the subsidy rate from
its optimal level to zero are substantial (up to three percent of lifetime consumption). More
17important, the welfare costs of deviating from the optimal scal policy are increasing in the
departing ination rate. The intuition behind the latter result is straightforward. Using the
Friedman rule implies that the only distortion in the model is the lack of monotonicity of the
buyer's surplus that results from Nash's bargaining solution. However, any deviation from the
Friedman rule brings introduces an additional distortion: the hold-up problem. Clearly, the
welfare costs of not providing a production subsidy when these two sources of frictions are active
will be higher than when monetary policy follows the Friedman rule.
2.6 Alternative operating procedures for monetary policy
Our previous results crucially depend on the availability of costless lump sum monetary transfers
in the centralized market. Hence, it seems important to study how the properties of monetary
equilibrium change once lump sum transfers are not available. This is the purpose of this section.
As mentioned previously, two frictions inherent in this model render equilibrium inecient
whenever the buyer does not have all the bargaining power. Hence, if we remove lump sum taxes,
the government only has one instrument, the subsidy rate, and it is very unlikely that optimality
can be restored. Moreover, without negative lump sum monetary transfers ination is directly
proportional to the subsidy rate since the following condition applies:
(1 + ) = (1 + s):
Hence, a production subsidy has an ambiguous eect on output at the decentralized market.
A positive subsidy induces producers to increase output at any moment in time. However, the
resulting higher ination creates an intertemporal distortion, the hold-up problem, which lowers
the incentives to produce. Indeed, the sign of
@qe
@s can be either zero, positive, or negative,
depending on the underlying parameterization of the model. For all calibrations considered so
far the value of this derivative is negative. In fact, we were only able to nd that a positive
subsidy is optimal for extremely low discount factors ( < 0:7). In light of these observations, it
seems natural to search for alternative instruments that may improve the eciency of monetary
equilibrium allocations whenever lump sum transfers are not available.
One potential mechanism to retire money from circulation is to transform the subsidy into
a tax, that is s < 0. This strategy is eective in retiring money from circulation but it reduces
production in the decentralized market, as suggested by Corollary 2. We consider instead a sales
tax on decentralized market transactions. Such a tax is possible given that the government can
monitor changes in money holdings before entering and leaving the central market. In particular,
if an agent lowers its money holdings by a D amount (the agent was a buyer in the decentralized
market), then the government collects an additional bD units of money from the agent before
entering the centralized market. Notice that with an appropriate value of the sales tax, the
18Friedman rule is feasible. Finally, this new scal tool also changes the bargaining problem of
buyers and sellers.
Since there are two frictions in the model, a complete taxing system requires an additional
instrument. We thus consider a production tax in the centralized market. This tax increases
the cost of consuming in the centralized market, giving incentives for agents to increase their
consumption in the decentralized market. In particular, by changing the production tax the
government is eectively changing the cost of consuming in the centralized market, and thus
the outside option of agents in the decentralized market. Moreover, the government can use the
goods that it collects from the production tax and sell them in exchange for money. Then these
money holdings can be retired from circulation, which is a form of open market operations based
on taxes and goods.
The remainder of this section formalizes the economic mechanisms just described. The value
function associated with trades in the centralized market is now determined by:
Wt(mt) = max
X;H;mt+1
fU(X)   H + Vt+1(mt+1)g (20)
s:t: X = H (1   N) + t(mt   mt+1);
where N is the tax rate on the production of the centralized market good.
After solving for X in the constraint and substituting into the objective function, this value
function is still linear in m; with slope

1 N: The bargaining problem of the representative

















where b is the sales tax rate in the decentralized market.
An important new feature of this bargaining problem is that, given m; production in the
decentralized market is decreasing in b and increasing in N: The latter situation is established
by the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For each value of the real money holdings of the buyer we have the following
results: (i) given N; q(z) is decreasing in b; and (ii) given b, q(z) is increasing in N.
The previous result holds for a given value of real money holdings and for any given value of
the buyer's bargaining weight, 0 <   1. However, real money holdings depend on the rate of
19return of money, which is denoted as
(1 + ) = (1   b):
The characterization of monetary equilibria and the denition of the government's problem
are analogous to those described in Sections 2.3-2.4. Now the government chooses the sales
and production tax rate that maximizes welfare (and our appendix provides the details). The
next subsection illustrates the properties of optimal scal and monetary policies in this new
environment.
2.6.1 Quantitative implications of optimal scal and monetary policies
For a given parameterization, the government's problem can be easily solved with standard
numerical methods. We study how optimal policy responds when no lump sum transfers are
available while using the calibration of Lagos and Wright (2005). Notice that a sales taxes make
the Friedman rule a feasible strategy even without negative lump sum monetary transfers. In
particular, it is possible to set b > 0 such that m1 =    1: However, this implementation of
the Friedman rule cannot achieve the ecient outcome since the unconstrained output solution








Moreover, in the appendix we establish qe < qu so that eciency, which requires qe=1, is not
possible.
Hence, if lump sum money extraction is not available, the resulting equilibrium will not be rst
best and the government must choose the optimal trade-o between the dierent instruments at
hand. Consider the strategy of lowering ination (maybe up to the Friedman rule) by setting b >
0: Lower ination may increase money that agents take to the decentralized market. However,
since q is decreasing in b, lower ination tends to lower equilibrium output in the bargaining
stage. Similarly, increasing production taxes in the centralized market, N, increases production
in the decentralized market. Production taxes, however, distort output in the centralized market.
The government faces a trade-o.
The rst row of results in Table 4 reports a version of the model where no taxes nor subsidies
are available; i.e., the Lagos and Wright case where ination is constrained to be zero. Optimal
policies for the benchmark experiment are reported in the second row of results in Table 4.
Finally, the last row of Table 4 considers a new experiment where all parameter values are held
constant but  is changed to 0:95: This last experiment illustrates how the trade-os in the
optimal taxation problem may change as the bargaining power of the buyer increases.
20Table 4: Welfare Maximizing Policies
  b N qe X
0.343 0% - - 0.29 1.78
0.343 -3.84% 8.42% 5.32% 0.81 1.7
0.950 -0.66% 1.24% 3.79% 0.87 1.71
As can be seen in Table 4, production and sales taxes have important quantitative implications
for output and welfare. Relative to the constrained Lagos and Wright (2005) case, with all taxes
set at zero, output in the decentralized market increases by a factor of 2.7 under the optimal
policy. When scal instruments are possible, the optimal policy involves the use of sales taxes
to implement the Friedman rule. The economic intuition behind the positive production tax
displayed in Table 4 is derived from Proposition 7. Production in the decentralized market is
increasing in N, and the government faces a trade-o since higher N lowers welfare in the
centralized market. The optimal production tax equates the marginal welfare gains from the
decentralized market with the marginal welfare losses of the centralized market.
Another interesting result in Table 4 is that the optimality of the Friedman rule depends on
the bargaining power of the buyer. Recall that a higher bargaining power for the buyer means
that less of the surplus associated with holding money will be taken away. As a result, it is
necessary to give a lower compensation to current producers in order for them to achieve the
socially optimal decentralized production. Moreover, reducing ination, by setting b > 0, lowers
production in the decentralized market. On the other hand, whenever the buyer is able to capture
more of the full benet from the match, it increases her incentives to hold money, causing q to
increase. Thus, whenever the bargaining power of the buyer is low enough, the Friedman rule
is optimal. As the bargaining power of the buyer increases we nd that it is optimal to have a
positive net nominal interest rate.
Until this point the government has been able to observe changes in the money holding
of agents. Knowledge of changes in money holdings by the government may be considered as
requiring too much information and too restrictive. With sales taxes in place, agents have a clear
incentive to not truthfully reveal changes in monetary holdings. Hence, truthful revelation will
only occur if the government can restrict from participating in the centralized market. Given
logarithmic preferences for consumption at the centralized market agents will always truthfully
reveal their money holdings.
3 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the interactions between
monetary and scal policies in an economic environment with microeconomic foundations for at
21money. In particular, this paper derives the optimal monetary and scal policies in a standard
search theoretic model of monetary exchange where production subsidies, sales taxes, and the
possibility of injecting at money at dierent times of the day are possible.
One of our main results is to show that, even when terms of trade in the decentralized
market are given by Nash's bargaining solution, some of the ineciencies in the Lagos and
Wright framework can be restored with appropriate scal policies. In particular, when lump sum
monetary transfers are possible, a production subsidy nanced by money printing can increase
output in the decentralized market. We also showed there exist multiple subsidies and (sometimes
strictly positive) ination rates that yield the ecient allocation. The Friedman rule is one of
the possible policy options that yields eciency. Finally, the Friedman rule is always an optimal
policy regardless of the bargaining power of the buyer.
When operating procedures for monetary policy prevent lump sum transfers, introducing
sales taxes in the decentralized market and production taxes in the centralized increase welfare.
The availability of a sales tax makes the Friedman rule a feasible policy. Moreover, introducing
a production tax in the centralized market increases production in the decentralized market. In
this new environment, the optimality of the Friedman rule depends largely on the bargaining
power of the buyer. In particular, for suciently low values of the bargaining power of the buyer
the Friedman rule is the unique optimal policy. In contrast, when the bargaining power is high
enough then deviations from the Friedman rule may occur. Irrespective of this bargaining power,
the ecient allocation cannot be achieved in a monetary equilibrium.
Finally, under any of the operating procedures for monetary and scal policy considered in
this paper, with or without lump sum taxes, large welfare gains are achieved by having scal and
monetary policies in place. Thus, ignoring active scal policies can be quite costly.
The ndings of this paper conrm the conjecture of Kocherlakota (2005) and Wright (2005)
that scal and monetary policies have important interactions in frameworks with micro founda-
tions for the existence of at money; thus, they should always be jointly considered in the design
of optimal government policy.
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Proof of Proposition 7






z(q) +  fu(q)   z(q)g

:
It is easy to show that z(q) is monotone in q (for a given set of taxes and subsidies). Thus the
rst term is monotone decreasing in q. The only relevant term to evaluate is the buyer's surplus.
From the proof of Proposition 4, however, we know the buyer's surplus is, in fact, given by
(1   )u0
(1 + s)u0 + (1   )
[u(q)(1 + s)   q]





1  (1 + s)   q
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q2 [(1 + s)q  + (1   )]
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q [(1 + s)q  + (1   )]
2
+
(1   )q1  (1   )
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q [(1 + s)q  + (1   )]




1  (1 + s)   q
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q2 [(1 + s)q  + (1   )]
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[q1  (1 + s)   q]




1  (1 + s)   q
i
[(1 + s)q1  (1   )   (1 + s)q1 ]
q2q [(1 + s)q  + (1   )]
2
Given we care only about the sign, we can multiply by a positive term, [ (1 + s)q  + (1   )]
2 ;
throughout. We also divide, each of the terms in brackets by q: Hence, the sign of the derivative
24of the buyer's surplus is given by:









  (1 + s)   1
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  (1 + s) + (1   )
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+ (1   )[   1]+ (23)
+ q
 2 (1 + s)
2 :
Notice that the second term in (23) is negative. The third term is positive and decreasing in q
at rate 2: The rst term may be positive or negative. Nevertheless, it is decreasing in q at rate
. It is also easy to show that at q, dened by q  = 1
1+s, the above expression is negative.
Notice that (23) goes to +1 as q goes to zero, and thus, by continuity, there is a ^ q such that (23)
equals zero. Finally, given the rates of decrease in q of the positive, and of the possibly negative
term, it follows that (23) is negative for all q > ^ q: We conclude that a maximum qe exists, that
it is interior, and that it satises qe < q for any given s;:
Proof of Proposition 8
To show output is increasing in 1
1+b, notice that corresponding equations (9) and (10) of our
new problem deliver the following:
u
0(q
u) = 1 + b:
Hence, the concavity of u(:) yields that qu is increasing in 1
1+b. Using the implicit function
theorem we can also derive the following:
@^ q







 ^ q + z
(1+b)(1 N)

  (1   )u0
:
Thus, given the monotonicity of u(:); the participation constraint  ^ q+ z
1+b  0, and the concavity
of u(:); ^ q is increasing in 1
1+b: The monotonicity of q and ^ q in 1
1+b establish (i). Similarly,
@^ q












 ^ q + z
(1+b)(1 N)

  (1   )u0
;
together with the fact that qu is independent of (1   N); delivers (ii).
Proof that qe<qu and z
1 b<zu
First of all note that given any sales and production tax rates (b;N) and a sequence of prices
25that grows at rate (1 + ); then the representative agent's problem can be written as:
(X
e;q




















In the same spirit as in Proposition 1, we know that if z
1 b>zu then q = qu for all z: Moreover,






the latter term is equal to zero then the objective of the representative household is constant
for all z





<0: Thus, it suces to consider the range
z
1+b zu and to study problem (13). From the rst order condition, equation (11), it is possible
to dene the output that solves the bargaining problem as a function of z: This function is
invertible so we have that:
z(q) 













; we follow Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007). In particular, notice
















Then, we substitute z into the left hand side of the above equation to get
(1   )u0
u0 + (1   )(1 + b)







Taking derivatives, one nds that the left hand side of equation (25) is non-monotone and that it
is negative as q % qu: The latter fact paired with  z0(q)< 0 implies that in any optimum qe<q;
so that z
1+b<z:
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